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We study a world with national external economies of scale at the industry level. In contrast to the
standard treatment with perfect competition and two industries, we assume Bertrand competition in
a continuum of industries. In this setting, many of the "pathologies" of the standard treatment disappear.
There typically exists a unique equilibrium with trade guided by "natural" comparative advantage.
And, when a country has CES preferences and any finite elasticity of substitution between goods, gains















External economies hold a central￿ albeit somewhat uncomfortable￿ place in the theory of in-
ternational trade. Since Marshall (1879, 1890) at least, economists have known that increasing
returns can be an independent cause of trade and that the advantages that derive from large
scale production need not be con￿ned within the boundaries of a ￿rm. Marshallian externalities
arise when knowledge and other public inputs associated with a ￿rm￿ s output spill over to the
bene￿t of other industry participants. After Marshall￿ s initial explication of the idea, a lengthy
debate ensued on whether an industry with external economies of scale could logically be mod-
elled as perfectly competitive.1 Even after the matter was ￿nally resolved in the a¢ rmative by
Chipman (1970), trade economists continued to bemoan the ￿bewildering variety of equilibria
[that provide] a taxonomy rather than a clear set of insights￿ (Krugman, 1995, p.1251), the
apparent tension between the forces of external economies and other, better-accepted determi-
nants of the trade pattern, and the ￿paradoxical￿implication that trade motivated by the gains
from concentrating production need not bene￿t the participating countries.
The modeling of external economies began at a time when game theoretic approaches to
imperfect competition were much less developed than they are today. Consequently, the logical
consistency between external economies and perfect competition was seen as a great advantage
in allowing the application of familiar tools of general equilibrium analysis. Economists were
comfortable in assuming that competitors take prices as given in industries with many small
￿rms. By assuming that small producers contribute little to aggregate industry output, they felt
similarly justi￿ed in assuming that ￿rms treat industry scale as given when assessing productivity
and making decisions about their own output. Firms might recognize the link between industry
scale and productivity and nonetheless perceive their own costs to be constant. As Chipman
(1970, p.349) noted, ￿there is no logical contradiction involved in the notion that economic
agents do not perceive things as they actually are, and while the idea of treating production
functions parametrically may be more subtle and unusual than that of treating market prices in
this way, both ideas are of the same logical order.￿
In application, the competitive models of external economies and trade yielded some dis-
comforting results.2 A potential for multiple equilibria, noted already by Ohlin (1933, p.55),
was shown more formally by Matthews (1949-1950), Kemp (1964), and Ethier (1982a). Gra-
ham (1923) argued that scale economies could reverse the trade pattern predicted by ￿natural￿
comparative advantage and Ethier (1982a) proved him correct in a competitive model with ex-
ternal economies. Markusen and Melvin (1982) and Ethier (1982a) observed that country size
1For a recount of the debate and its protoganists, see Chipman (1965).
2There are several good surveys of this literature, beginning with Chipman￿ s (1965) treatment of the earliest
contributions. Subsequent overviews include Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch.3), Krugman
(1995), and Choi and Yu (2003).
1might play an independent role in determining the pattern of specialization. Finally, Graham
(1923) advanced the possibility of losses from trade, an idea that has been further addressed by
Matthews (1949-1950), Melvin (1969), Markusen and Melvin (1982), Ethier (1982a), and oth-
ers. These ￿pathologies￿are perhaps responsible for the diminished role that external economies
now play in thinking about trade, even as such externalities are still considered to be empirically
relevant in many contexts.3
The pathological outcomes arise in a canonical model of external economies and trade, one
that has become well ensconced in the literature and that by now breeds little questioning of
its underlying assumptions. Typically, there are two countries and two industries, one with
constant returns to scale and the other with increasing returns to scale (IRS) due to national
spillovers from production. Often, labor is the only productive factor. Firms in both sectors are
price takers and, more importantly, those in the IRS sector take aggregate national output and
hence their own potential productivity as given.
In this familiar setting, suppose that the relationship between productivity and national scale
is such that zero output implies zero productivity. Then the existence of multiple equilibria is
immediate. Firms that take aggregate output as given perceive zero productivity when no
other national producers are active in their country. If output in a country is nil, no producer
perceives a pro￿t opportunity from entry, even when an absence of local competitors might
imply a potential for pro￿t for a ￿rm that evaluates correctly the implications of entry at non-
negligible scale. Thus, zero output in any location is self-reinforcing and production of the IRS
good can be concentrated in either country for any set of parameter values.4
What about the pattern of trade? When production of the IRS good is concentrated in a
country, the trade pattern necessarily accords with the ranking of relative productivities when
measured at the equilibrium scales of production. That is, each country specializes according
to observed comparative advantage, where the ￿observed￿productivity of a country that does
not produce the IRS good is taken to be zero. However, the pattern of specialization need
not conform to the ranking of relative productivities when measured at a common scale of
production. The exporters of the IRS good might be less productive than ￿rms in the other
country would be, were the latter to produce at a comparable aggregate scale. In this sense, the
trade pattern may run counter to the dictates of natural comparative advantage. Notice that
such a trade pattern violates the requirements for global e¢ ciency in circumstances in which
the country with comparative advantage in the IRS industry has su¢ cient resources to satisfy
the ￿rst-best level of world demand for that good.
3See, for example, Caballero and Lyons (1989, 1990, 1992), Chan, Chen and Cheung (1995), Segoura (1996),
Henriksen, Midlefart-Knarvik, and Steen (2001) and Antweiler and Tre￿ er (2002).
4If productivity is bounded from below even when national output is zero, multiple trade equilibria will exist
for a range of parameter values.
2In the canonical model, country size can be an independent source of comparative advantage.
Suppose, for example, that productivity in the IRS sector is modest when output is small, but
not equal to zero. If a small country were to specialize in producing this good, the equilibrium
price might be high in light of its meager resource base and a robust level of world demand.
Such a high price might invite entry by producers in the large country. In such circumstances,
there may be no equilibrium with production of the IRS concentrated in the small country. The
large country gains a comparative advantage in the IRS industry by dint of having su¢ cient
resources to produce at large scale.
The canonical model readily yields examples with losses from trade (see, e.g., Helpman and
Krugman, 1985, p.55). The autarky equilibrium features underproduction of the IRS good,
because ￿rms fail to take into account the spillover bene￿t from increasing their output on the
productivity of others. As is well known, trade can bring harm if it exacerbates a pre-existing
market distortion (Bhagwati, 1971). It stands to reason that trade may reduce welfare in a
country that shifts substantial resources from the single industry with increasing returns to one
with constant returns.
In short, the pathologies that emerge from the canonical model rest on two critical assump-
tions. First, ￿rms contemplate entry only at such small scale that they believe they can have
negligible impact on national output and their own productivity. Second, industries are large in
relation to countries￿resource endowments, so that a small country may lack su¢ cient resources
to meet world demands for the IRS good at a reasonable price. In this paper, we modify these
two familiar assumptions and show how this dramatically narrows the scope for pathological
outcomes. We assume in what follows that ￿rms engage in Bertrand competition and that they
correctly anticipate their productivity when they quote a price that would yield non-negligible
sales. And we assume that the world economy comprises a large number of (small) industries,
so that any industry can be fully accommodated in any country, no matter what its size.5
It is well known that perfect competition and Bertrand competition predict similar outcomes
in models with homogeneous goods and constant costs. This is true as well￿ it turns out￿ in an
autarky equilibrium with external economies of scale. However, the predictions of the alternative
behavioral assumptions diverge in a world with national external economies and international
trade. With Bertrand competition, a ￿rm may be small when its price is the same as that of
its (domestic) rivals￿ as will be the case in the equilibria that we discuss￿ yet it may recognize
that by announcing a price below that o⁄ered by other ￿rms in the industry, it can grow to
non-negligible scale. We shall see that the di⁄erent out-of-equilibrium beliefs under perfect and
5In our analysis the scope of the external e⁄ects is supposed to be the industry. So it is essential for us to
assume that industries are small relative to country sizes. As advocated by Ethier (1982b), one could also think of
externalities that transcend both industry and country boundaries. However, external economies at the industry
level are plausible in the presence of industry-speci￿c knowledge and other non-rival inputs, and the literature
cited in footnote 3 points to their empirical signi￿cance.
3Bertrand competition yield very di⁄erent conclusions about the possibility of multiple equilibria
and the determinants of the trade pattern.
Moreover, the potential role for country size to in￿ uence the trade pattern disappears when
industries are small in relation to the size of national economies. In a world with many industries
￿ la Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), a small country can realize its comparative
advantage in whichever sectors it is strongest by serving world demands in a relatively small
range of industries. We will ￿nd that country size plays no role in determining a chain of
comparative advantage, although it does a⁄ect the dividing line between imports and exports
along that chain. The assumption of a large number of small industries also helps to justify
our assumption that ￿rms take factor prices as given. A Bertrand competitor may entertain the
prospect of growing large in its industry. But, even if it does so, it will remain small in relation to
the aggregate economy so long as each industry uses a small fraction of the economy￿ s resources.
In summary, we study a model with a continuum of industries and national industry-level
external economies. We assume that ￿rms in an industry produce a homogeneous product and
engage in Bertrand (price) competition in an integrated world market. Countries may exhibit
Ricardian technological di⁄erences, but they share the same prospects for scale economies, which
are assumed to be a property of the good being produced. We ￿nd in this setting that the trade
equilibrium typically is unique and that ￿natural￿comparative advantage determines an order-
ing of industries.6 Most surprising, perhaps, are our ￿ndings about welfare. We consider for
this purpose a country whose residents hold CES preferences over the set of goods, with possible
asymmetries in the weighting of di⁄erent goods, and with any ￿nite elasticity of substitution.
This includes, of course, the Cobb-Douglas case that has been used in the literature to demon-
strate the possibility of losses from trade based on external economies of scale. We ￿nd, in
contrast, that in spite of the generic ine¢ ciency of the autarky and trade equilibria, gains from
trade are assured.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops our alternative
model with Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. There, we derive our predic-
tions about the pattern of trade. Section 3 contains a brief review of the e¢ ciency properties
of the model, which sets the stage for the gains-from-trade analysis in the subsequent section.
Section 5 concludes.
6If the countries share identical technologies for some or many goods, the model does not predict which goods
are produced in each country. But factor prices and consumption levels typically are uniquely determined even
in this case.
42 A Model of External Economies in a Continuum of Industries
We study an economy with a continuum of industries, as in Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson
(1977; hereinafter, DFS). Goods are indexed by i 2 [0;1]. For the time being, we assume only
that preferences in each country are such that a change in the price of a single good has a
negligible e⁄ect on the demand for all goods other than itself.7 Demands need not be identical
in the two countries, nor need they be homothetic.
Goods are produced by a single primary factor, labor. Throughout the paper, we take the
home wage as numeraire. Technology exhibits constant or increasing returns due to external
economies at the local industry level. In the home country, ai=Ai(xi) units of labor are required
for a unit of output, where xi is aggregate home production of good i and Ai(￿) is non-decreasing,
concave, and has an elasticity smaller than one.8 In the foreign country, the unit labor require-
ment is a￿
i=Ai(x￿
i). There are ni potential producers of good i in the home country and n￿
i
potential producers in the foreign country, where ni ￿ 2 and n￿
i ￿ 2. The number of potential
producers in each country can be very large, but is assumed to be ￿nite. Firms in each industry
engage in price (Bertrand) competition in the integrated world market. Each ￿rm recognizes
that, if it sets a price above that quoted by any other ￿rm, it will consummate no sales, if it sets
a price that is the lowest among all quoted prices, it will capture the entirety of world demand,
and if it sets a price that is tied for lowest among a group of competitors, it will share demand
with these rivals.
2.1 Autarky Equilibrium
Figure 1 shows the inverse demand curve for good i, labelled DD, for a given level of aggregate
spending and a given level of any price aggregate that may a⁄ect the demand for this good.
Firms in the industry take aggregate spending and the relevant price index (if any) as given.
The ￿gure also depicts the average cost curve, which is labelled CC. Intersection points are our
candidates for industry equilibrium.
Suppose ￿rms in industry i announce a price above ~ pi in Figure 1. Then a deviant ￿rm could
announce a price a bit lower than that o⁄ered by the others. The ￿rm would capture all industry
sales, and since its price would exceed its average cost at the resulting scale of production, it
would earn a pro￿t. Evidently, the price will be bid down at least to ~ pi. But a further price
cut by any ￿rm would spell losses, since the deviant would capture the market but fail to cover
its costs. When the DD curve is everywhere steeper than the CC curve, as in Figure 1, then
7In this, we follow Wilson (1980). The Cobb-Douglas preferences invoked by DFS, as well as CES, Stone-Geary,
and symmetric translog all have this property, as do many others.
8As in the literature, an elasticity of productivity with respect to output smaller than one is needed to ensure













Figure 1: Unique Intersection of DD and CC
the unique intersection point depicts the industry equilibrium. In this equilibrium, price equals
industry average cost and an arbitrary (and possibly large) number of ￿rms make sales but earn
zero pro￿ts.
In Figure 2, the DD and CC curves have multiple intersections at E0, E00, and E. Neither
E0 nor E00 represents an equilibrium, because if all ￿rms charge the price associated with either
of these points, a deviant ￿rm can announce a lower price such that, at the associated demand
level, price exceeds average cost. The equilibrium in industry i is at the lowest intersection of










Figure 2: Multiple Intersections of DD and CC
9If no such intersection exists, then the price would tend toward zero and output would tend toward in￿nity.
But then the assumption that ￿rms take wages as given becomes untenable.
6The general equilibrium requires, of course, that every industry equilibrates and that the
labor market clears. There is no need to develop the notation to express this for the general










where ci is consumption of good i, with ￿ < 1 and
R 1
0 bidi = 1. These preference imply a constant












is the exact price index associated
with the CES utility function. With these demands, the condition that DD is steeper than CC
at output xi is equivalent to
￿￿i(xi) < 1,
where ￿i ￿ A0
i(xi)xi=A(xi) is the elasticity of the productivity function with respect to output.
A su¢ cient condition for existence of an industry equilibrium with ￿nite xi is ￿￿i(x) < 1 for
all x.10 We will assume that an equilibrium with ￿nite output exists in every industry, either
because these su¢ cient conditions are satis￿ed, or otherwise.
In the autarky equilibrium (denoted again by tildes), aggregate spending ~ E equals aggregate





~ P1￿￿ for all i, (2)




for all i. (3)
This gives a system of equations that jointly determine outputs and prices in all industries.
We note in passing that the autarky equilibrium with Bertrand competition is the same as
would arise under perfect competition, were ￿rms to take their own productivity as given. Price
in every industry is equal to average cost. Firms earn zero pro￿ts. Demand equals supply for
all goods. And the labor market clears.
10Note that Ethier (1982, p.1247) invokes essentially the same assumption as a condition for uniqueness and
stabilitiy of equilibrium in his two-industry model.
72.2 Trade Equilibrium
We now open the economy to international trade. Again, competition between the potential
producers in a country drives price for every good i down to average cost. But now it also must
be the case that a potential producer in the ￿other￿country does not wish to shave price further.
If home producers in industry i quote the price wai=A(xi), a foreign ￿rm could announce a price
a bit lower than that, capture sales of xi, and achieve labor productivity of a￿
i=Ai(xi). Such a
strategy would be pro￿table if its per unit cost, w￿a￿
i=Ai(xi), were less than the quoted price.








(Note that w = 1, because the home wage is numeraire.) Similarly, if production of good i is










Assuming that each good is produced in only one location (which will be true in equilibrium), the
equilibrium price of a good equals the lesser of the two average costs evaluated at the equilibrium










for all i, (4)
where ￿ xi is world output of good i in the trade equilibrium.
Now order the goods so that ￿i ￿ ai=a￿
i is increasing in i and de￿ne I by ￿I = w￿. Then
(4) implies that goods with i ￿ I are produced in the home country and goods with i > I
are produced in the foreign country.11 Figure 3￿ familiar from DFS￿ depicts this relationship
between w￿ and I as the curve AA. It depicts as well a second relationship between these
variables implied by the labor-market-clearing condition. The greater is I, the fewer are the
goods produced in the foreign country and the lower must be the foreign wage for the labor
market there to clear. This relationship is labelled BB. The equilibrium marginal good and
relative wage are found at the intersection of the two curves. This determination of I and w￿
is, of course, exactly the same as in DFS, as extended by Wilson (1980) to include economies
with more general demands.
Two observations are in order. First, the pattern of specialization is well determined. The
possibility of multiple locations for a given industry disappears once ￿rms recognize that, even
11For notational convenience, we adopt the convention that the marginal good is produced in the home country,









Figure 3: Free Trade Equilibrium
if small in equilibrium, each can overcome any coordination failure by becoming large when the
opportunity presents itself. Moreover, there is no danger that a country will lack the resources
to accommodate a particular industry at the scale required to meet world demand. In a world
of many industries, countries can adjust on the extensive margin by hosting greater or fewer
numbers of them, without sacri￿cing the bene￿ts that come from concentrating an industry in
a single location.
Second, the pattern of specialization conforms to the pattern of comparative advantage, when
the latter is evaluated at a common scale of production. We have assumed in our formulation (as
in the standard approach) that countries share the same scale economies, which are a property
of the industry and not the place of production. Countries di⁄er only with respect to a set of
Hicks-neutral (and scale neutral) technology parameters. Then, with no risk of coordination
failure, the country that enjoys the relative technological advantage in an industry will capture
that industry￿ and its associated scale economies￿ in the general equilibrium. All that remains
to be determined, as in DFS, is the margin between industries that locate at home and those
that locate abroad. Indeed, the DFS model is a special case of ours with Ai(xi) ￿ 1 for all i.
Here, as there, the dividing line in the chain of comparative advantage is determined by the
relative sizes of the countries, the pattern of world demand, and the pattern of technologies in
the various industries.
Note that country size plays no role in determining relative productivity. Since every individ-
ual industry is small in relation to the size of either economy, any country can produce enough
of any good to meet the pressures of world demand. The relative size of the two countries a⁄ects
the margin I between the set of each country￿ s import goods and its export goods, but it cannot
a⁄ect the ordering of goods in those sets.
In short, by incorporating many industries and amending ￿rms￿perceptions about their
9own productivity, we have overturned several conclusions from the canonical analysis. Multiple
equilibria are not pervasive and ￿natural￿comparative advantage rules.
A pedagogically interesting special case arises when the countries share identical technologies
and di⁄er only in labor supplies. This setting has been used by some authors to argue that trade
induced by external economies will not equalize factor prices in a pair of countries that di⁄er
only in size.12 However, this conclusion also rests on the assumption that individual industries
are large in relation to the sizes of the national economies. In our model, when ai = a￿
i for all
i, if w￿ 6= 1, then all industries would locate in the low-wage country. This is not consistent, of
course, with labor-market clearing in the other country, so factor prices must be equalized. With
equal factor prices and identical technologies, the pattern of specialization is not determined.
What is determined is only the aggregate employment levels in the two countries which, in
equilibrium, matches the exogenous labor supplies. A small country can employ its labor force
in equilibrium by producing and exporting a moderate number of goods produced in relatively
small quantities or a smaller number of goods that require greater numbers of workers to meet
world demand. In any case, di⁄erences in country size are accommodated by the number of
goods produced in each country and not by the identities of which goods are produced where.
3 E¢ ciency and the First-Best
Both in autarky and in a trade equilibrium, e¢ ciency requires equality between the marginal
rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation for every pair of goods. In our
setting, utility-maximizing consumers equate as usual the marginal rate of substitution between
goods to the relative price. But, in general, the marginal rate of transformation is not equal to
the relative price due to the presence of production externalities. Therefore, neither the autarky
equilibrium nor the free-trade equilibrium achieves an e¢ cient allocation of labor.
To see this, note that the marginal product of labor in industry i in the autarky equilibrium
is Ai(~ xi)=ai (1 ￿ ￿i).13 It follows that the autarky marginal rate of transformation between good
i and good j is
^ MRTij =
￿
1 ￿ ￿i(~ xi)






1 ￿ ￿i(~ xi)





where the second equality follows from (3); i.e. from price equals average cost. Therefore, the
autarky relative outputs of goods i and j can be e¢ cient only if it happens that ￿i(~ xi) = ￿j(~ xj):
Similarly, the free-trade relative outputs can be e¢ cient only if ￿i(xi) = ￿j(xj). With relative
12See, for example, Markusen and Melvin (1981) and Ethier (1982a).













10prices equal to relative average costs, they will not generally be equal to relative marginal costs.
A set of Pigouvian subsidies could be used to achieve the autarky ￿rst best. A similar set of
subsidies, together with a set of optimum tari⁄s, could do likewise for a country that trades.
It should be clear from the discussion that the autarky equilibrium achieves the ￿rst best in
the special case in which all industries bear a constant and common degree of scale economies.14
If ￿i(x) ￿ ￿ for all x and i, the equality between price and average cost in every industry ensures
equality between relative prices and marginal rates of transformation. With trade, the ￿rst best
still requires a set of optimal tari⁄s. But gains from (free) trade can be established for this
special case in the usual way.15
4 Gains from Trade
To study the prospects for gains from trade with more general production technologies, we
posit CES preferences for the home country. Domestic preferences are described by the utility
function in (1). We make no assumptions about the weighting of the various goods in utility,
about foreign preferences, or about the productivity functions Ai(xi). In particular, we allow
for varying degrees of scale economies across industries and non-constant output elasticities in
any or all of them.
4.1 Elastic Demands
We begin with ￿ ￿ 1, which generates demands that are price elastic. Let us suppose that
there are losses from trade; i.e., U < ~ U. Since the home wage is numeraire in both the autarky
and trade equilibria, U < ~ U requires P > ~ P; i.e., a lower real income with trade than without
implies a higher price index.
In Figure 4, we show the autarky equilibrium in some industry i. It is found at ~ E, the






as we have noted before (see Equation 2).
14See Chipman (1970) for an, early, formal demonstration of this point.
15For the case of constant and common elasticities ￿, the free-trade output vector maximizes the value of
domestic output given prices. We can prove gains from trade using the standard, revealed-preference argument:
The value of free-trade consumption vector at the prices of the trade equilibrium equals the value of the free-
trade output vector at those prices, which exceeds the value of autarky output vector at those prices, which in
turn equals the value of the autarky consumption vector at those prices. So, consumers could buy the autarky
consumption bundle in the trade equilibrium with the income available to them. If they chose not to do so, it
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Figure 4: Hypothesized Industry Equilibrium Assuming Losses from Trade







i(p;w￿L￿) > 0 is the foreign demand for good i in the trade equilibrium (an arbitrary
function of the vector of prices p and foreign income, w￿L￿). The hypothesis that P > ~ P
implies that P1￿￿ < ~ P1￿￿ under the assumption that demand is elastic (￿ ￿ 1). Then, the
substitution e⁄ect of the higher price level outweighs the income e⁄ect on the demand for good
i, so the inverse demand curve with trade￿ DD in the ￿gure￿ lies to the right of ~ D ~ D under the










where ￿ xi again is the total world output of good i. This curve coincides with ~ C ~ C for i ￿ I; i.e.,
for goods that are produced by the home country in the trade equilibrium. It lies below ~ C ~ C
(as depicted in Figure 4) for goods that are produced abroad (i > I); these goods are imported
by the home country only because their average cost is less than it would be with domestic
production. In either case, the intersection of DD and CC lies below and to the right of ~ E.
As the ￿gure makes clear, our hypothesis that P > ~ P implies pi < ~ pi for an arbitrary good i,
be it one that is exported in equilibrium or one that is imported. Therefore, all prices are lower
in the trade equilibrium than in the autarky equilibrium (relative to the domestic wage). But
this is a contradiction, because the price index cannot rise if each element in the index falls. We
conclude that P < ~ P and thus U > ~ U; i.e., the home country gains from trade!
Since P < ~ P and ￿ ￿ 1, the inverse demand curve DD may, in fact, be to the left or to
12the right of ~ D ~ D. Apparently, aggregate output in some industries might fall as the result of the
opening of trade. Nonetheless, the impact of these cases cannot be so great as to negate the
overall gains that come from international specialization according to comparative advantage
and the realization of greater scale economies due to the expansion of the market.
4.2 Inelastic Demands
Next consider the case of ￿ < 1; i.e., inelastic demands. Since there are gains from trade as ￿
approaches one from below16, and the model is continuous in the parameter ￿, trade losses for
some ￿ would imply the existence of a ^ ￿ such that P(^ ￿) = ~ P(^ ￿), in the obvious notation. Let us
suppose this to be true, and consider further the autarky and trade equilibria that would arise
when ￿ = ^ ￿.



















where the inequality in the second line follows from the fact that ai ￿ min[ai;a￿
iw￿] and
c￿














Therefore ￿ xi=Ai(￿ xi) > ~ xi=Ai(~ xi). But the function xi=Ai(xi) is increasing in xi by the assumption
that ￿i(xi) < 1. So the string of inequalities implies ￿ xi > ~ xi, which in turn implies pi < ~ pi.
This contradicts our supposition that pi > ~ pi. We conclude that pi < ~ pi for all i, which in turn
implies P < ~ P. It follows that there can exist no ^ ￿ for which the price index under autarky is
the same as the price index with trade. Again, the home country gains from trade!
Figure 5 illustrates the autarky and free-trade equilibrium in a typical industry i when ￿ < 1.
With P < ~ P and ￿ < 1, the DD curve necessarily lies to the right of the ~ D ~ D curve. The CC
curve is identical to ~ C ~ C for i ￿ I and strictly below it for i > I. It follows that ￿ xi > ~ xi for all i.
In this case, trade expands the world output of every good. All prices fall relative to the home
16The limiting case of the CES as ￿ ! 1 is equivalent to Cobb-Douglas preferences. Gains from trade for these
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Figure 5: Autarky and Trade Equilibrium for ￿ < 1
wage, and domestic workers bene￿t as a result.
We have established gains from trade for the home country when its residents have CES
preferences, independent of the elasticity of substitution, the pattern of comparative advantage,
the pattern of scale economies, and the details of foreign preferences. This goes some way toward
overturning the ￿paradoxical￿welfare implications that derive from the standard analysis, and
the discomfort generated therefrom.
5 Concluding Remarks
The extensive literature on external economies typically posits a competitive environment with
many small ￿rms. Researchers have used the small size of producers in a competitive equilibrium
to justify an assumption that ￿rms neglect the impact of their output decisions on aggregate
scale and productivity. We have argued that it is not the equilibrium size of a ￿rm that mat-
ters for its assessment of productivity, but rather the nature of industry competition and, in
particular, whether a ￿rm can foresee growing large as a result of its actions. When indus-
try participants believe that they can grow large, the potential for internalization is enough to
coordinate locational decisions even when externalities remain pervasive in equilibrium.
The literature also typically focuses on an environment with only two industries. Often
the assumption is made for convenience, although it might be appropriate if external scale
economies spread throughout broad sectors. If, instead, external economies are generated by
speci￿c activities, a model with many activities may be more appropriate. Then, country size
no longer plays the role that it does in the standard analysis, because a small country can
accommodate all of some activities so long as it hosts relatively few of them.
14These observations may have more general applicability than our simple Ricardian model.
For example, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) study task trade between similar countries.
They assume that ￿rms perform a continuum of tasks to generate output and that productivity
in each task depends on how frequently it is performed by all ￿rms in that same location. In that
setting, a ￿rm can grow large by serving as a potential supplier of a task to others. Although no
outsourcing takes place in equilibrium, the potential for same is enough to coordinate locational
decisions for each task. Moreover, the fact that each task is small means that any task might
be concentrated in a small country.
Another relevant application can be found in urban economics. The existence of cities seems
evidence of agglomeration economies that are, at least partially, external to the ￿rm. As in
our setup, a site can have small or zero productivity if no ￿rm locates there, but could be as
productive as New York if ten million people reside nearby. Multiple equilibria are pervasive in
models of systems of cities, as sites may or may not host cities depending on whether agents
coordinate to live there. To address this problem, the urban economics literature has invoked the
actions of large ￿ city corporations￿(Henderson, 1974) that can subsidize factors to encourage
the internalization of externalities and thereby coordinate location decisions.17 Our theory
provides an alternative mechanism for coordination in naturally productive sites. If ￿rms engage
in Bertrand competition, each will recognize that by locating alone in a ￿good￿ site it can
potentially achieve e¢ cient scale as a ￿one-company town.￿Such a producer might still be small
in relation to the aggregate economy, if the number of towns or cities is large. In equilibrium,
all towns may house numerous ￿rms, yet the equilibrium allocation of activities across space
will be unique. In short, our conclusions about trade with many industries may apply as well
to agglomeration with many cities.
Our paper demonstrates that the size of industries (or cities) and the nature of the compe-
tition ought to be carefully considered in future modeling of external scale economies.
17Durable housing investments can also serve as a coordinating mechanism in dynamic models, as shown by
Anas (1992) and Henderson and Venables (2008).
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